Washington Law Review
Volume 71

Number 2

4-1-1996

Police Power, Gifts, and the Washington Constitution: A
Framework for Determining the Validity of Property Rights
Legislation
Gregory M. Mohrman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Gregory M. Mohrman, Notes and Comments, Police Power, Gifts, and the Washington Constitution: A
Framework for Determining the Validity of Property Rights Legislation, 71 Wash. L. Rev. 461 (1996).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol71/iss2/6

This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Copyright 0 1996 by Washington Law Review Association

POLICE POWER, GIFTS, AND THE WASHINGTON
CONSTITUTION: A FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING
THE VALIDITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS LEGISLATION
Gregory M. Mohrman
Abstract: In November 1995, Washington voters rejected Initiative 164, a revolutionary
property rights law that would have required governmental entities to compensate landowners
for any loss in property value due to regulations on land use, unless those regulations were
designed to prevent a public nuisance. Despite the initiative's defeat at the polls, a strong
property rights movement is likely to prompt legislators to consider implementing a
percentage-loss formula for determining when regulators owe compensation to property
owners. This Comment discusses the inherent police power of the state to regulate property
use in the public interest and argues that percentage-loss laws would violate article 8, sections
5 and 7 of the Washington Constitution, which prohibit the state and municipal corporations
from giving gifts to private entities.

During 1990 and 1991, the Washington State Legislature enacted
successive portions of the Growth Management Act (GMA).' Among the
most ambitious controlled-growth laws in the nation, the GMA created a
comprehensive framework for coordinated county and state development
planning.2 In recent years, this legislation has generated intense, negative
reactions from property owners due to what many view as overlybureaucratic structures and burdensome regulations. The resulting clamor
for increased fairness to landowners spawned Initiative 164, which was
adopted by the Legislature in April 1995 as the Property Rights
Regulatory Fairness Act.? The Act, intended to "provide remedies to
property owners in addition to any constitutional rights,"4 would have
required, among other things, that the government compensate
landowners for any loss in property value due to regulation for "public
benefit," unless a "public nuisance [would] be created absent the
regulation."5 Opponents successfully petitioned for a referendum on the
Act, and on November 7, 1995, voters rejected the initiative.6

1. Wash. Rev. Code ch. 36.70A (1994).
2. See generally Richard L. Settle & Charles G. Gavigan, The Growth Management Revolution in
Washington: Past,Present,and Future, 16 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 867 (1993).
3. 1995 Wash. Laws Ch. 98 (Wash. Init. 164).
4. Wash. Initiative 164, § I.
5. Wash. Initiative 164, § 4(l).
6. Jim Simon & David Postman, Voters Say No to Sweeping Change, Seattle Times, Nov. 8, 1995,
at Al. Referendum 48 failed by a 60% percent (against) to 40% percent (for) margin. Id.
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Undaunted, property rights advocates in the Legislature and in the
public at large are confident that a solution will be found to perceived
problems of unreasonable government regulation. This solution probably
will come in the form of legislative action.7 Environmental and local
government groups counter that the voters have spoken and that strong
support for land use and environmental regulation should block attempts
to dilute the GMA and similar controlled-growth measures. : The tensions
embodied in this debate are more fundamental, however, than simply
reconciling the desire to harness development and protect Washington's
natural resources with a belief that individual property owners should not
bear the brunt of such legislation. At their core, proposals similar to
Initiative 164 question the nature of the state government's role as
expressed in the Washington State Constitution.
Government's authority to regulate the use of property in the interest
of the public welfare comes directly from inherent legislative police
power, delegated by the Washington Constitution 1:omunicipal
corporations. 9 The state's police power is limited only by the state and
federal constitutions, which together delineate the proper realm of
governmental action in the State of Washington. Furthermore, the
framers of the state constitution included prohibitions against
government gifts of money or property to any "individual, association,
company or corporation," except to support the "poor and infirm."'0
Insofar as legislation might require that government pay property owners
for obeying laws passed through the legitimate exercise of the police
power, measures bolstering property rights may violate the constitutional
ban on gifts to private entities.
The purpose of this Comment is to explore these issues in more detail
and to help define the constitutional context for future property rights
legislation in Washington. Part I presents a background of the state's
police power to regulate the use of property. Its focus is the existing
constitutional limits on the exercise of that power. It examines in detail
the requirements of substantive due process and just compensation for

7. See Michael Paulson, Lawmakers Still Back Land-Use Compensation, Seattle PostIntelligencer, Nov. 9, 1995, at Al, A4.
8. Id. at A4.
9. Wash. Const. art. XI, § I ("Any county, city, town or township may make and enforce within
its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general
laws.").
10. Wash. Const. art. VIII, § 7 (stating that counties, cities, towns, or other mun cipal corporations
may not give money or lend credit). Article 8, section 5, although worded slightly differently, has
been interpreted to extend similar prohibitions to the state itself.See infra notes 95--97.
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takings of property, which together form the most prominent restrictions
on land use regulations. Part II examines case law interpreting the
constitutional prohibition on governmental gifts to private individuals
and corporations. Finally, part III argues that any law mandating
payments to landowners in cases where property value is decreased by
regulation, but where "just compensation" is not constitutionally
mandated, would be invalid because such payments would amount to
unconstitutional gifts to private persons.
I.

POLICE POWER TO REGULATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THAT POWER

A.

Police Power in Washington

The state's inherent police power"1 to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of its citizens is an essential attribute of sovereignty.' 2 Not only
is this power fundamental, but organized government cannot divest itself
of it.'3 This general police power to protect public welfare is reserved to
the states by the Tenth Amendment.' 4 The power of the state legislature
is unlimited, except by provisions of the federal and state constitutions.' 5
This power has been expressly granted to any "county, city, town or
township" by article 11, section 11 of the Washington State
Constitution.' 6 Thus, these entities exercise power within their
jurisdictions that is equivalent to that of the Legislature, 7 unless that
power is restricted or pre-empted by the state.' 8
11. "The word 'police' is derived from the Greek word 'polis,' meaning city.... Accordingly, the
term 'police power' in its original and most comprehensive meaning, denotes the power of
government in every sovereignty, that is to say, the power to govern men and things." 6A Eugene
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations§ 24.02 (3d ed. 1988).
12. See County of Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 712, 719, 419 P.2d 993, 998 (1966)
(citing Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 153, 53 P.2d 615, 619 (1936)) (additional citations omitted).
13. Shea, 185 Wash. at 153,53 P.2d at 619.
14. U.S. Const. amend X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
15. See Philip A. Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporationsin Washington, 38
Wash. L. Rev. 743, 743-44 (1963). While the U.S. Constitution grants powers to the federal
government, the Washington State Constitution places limits on the powers of the state legislature.
Id. at 743.
16. Wash. Const. art. Xl, § 11.
17. Detamore v. Hindley, 83 Wash. 322, 326, 145 P. 462, 463 (1915) (stating that article 11,
section II "is a direct delegation of the police power as ample within its limits as that possessed by
the legislature itself').
18. See State v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 162, 166-67, 615 P.2d 461, 463 (1980);
Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima, 52 Wash. 2d 617, 622, 328 P.2d 873, 877 (1958).
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Early in the state's existence, Washington courts acknowledged a
general inability to precisely define the police power and attempted to
determine whether specific government actions could tie included or
excluded from this power based on the generalized principle that "the
welfare of the people is the highest law."' 9 This concept of police power
not only embraced the protection of health, safety, and the suppression of
public nuisances, but was expanded to include "all those regulations
designed to promote public convenience, the general welfare, the general
prosperity, and.., all great public needs."20 This power was determined
to be primary to most private rights, including the right to contrace' and
the right to pursue a livelihood.' The broadening view of the police
power also was articulated in terms of judicial deference to legislative
determinations of the public interest.' Under this doctrine, the judiciary
does not evaluate whether the actions of the legislature in fact promote
the public welfare. Instead, courts presume "every such act ... to be in
the interest of the public welfare if a state of facts might reasonably exist
which would justify it."'24 This principle of deference to legislative
enactments reflects, in the eyes of the courts, "the line of demarcation
between legislative and judicial functions."2
Property rights are subject to the proper exercise of police power.26 As
early as 1900, the Washington Supreme Court held that the Legislature
may restrict the use of land to protect against private nuisances.27 In
Bowes v. Aberdeen,28 the court described the right of property as a "legal
and not a natural right."29 As such, it "must be measured always by
19. State v. Mountain Timber Co., 75 Wash. 581, 588, 135 P. 645, 648 (1913); see also City of
Tacoma v. Boutelle, 61 Wash. 434, 112 P. 661 (1911).
20. State v. Pitney, 79 Wash. 608, 611, 140 P. 918, 919 (1914).
21. City of Seattle v. Hurst, 50 Wash. 424, 91 P. 454 (1908) (holding that ordinance restricting
hack drivers from soliciting business in train stations was reasonable and valid exercise of police
power which prohibited train station from entering exclusive contract with private agency for such
services).
22. Smith v. City of Spokane, 55 Wash. 219, 104 P. 249 (1909) (upholding ordinance creating
exclusive city function to collect and dispose of garbage and other noxious substances).

23. See City of Tacoma v. Fox, 158 Wash. 325, 290 P. 1010 (1930).
24. Id. at331, 290 P. at 1012.
25. Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 33, 586 P.2d 860, 869 (1978); Lenci v.
City of Seattle, 63 Wash. 2d 664,668, 388 P.2d 926, 929 (1964).
26. The right to keep and bear arms provides a useful analogy. The right of ownership and
possession of firearms is also necessarily qualified by certain limitations imposed in the public
interest. See Second Amendment Found. v. City of Renton, 35 Wash. App. 583, 668 P.2d 596
(1983).
27. Karasek v. Peier, 22 Wash. 419, 61 P. 33 (1900).
28. 58 Wash. 535, 109 P. 369 (1910).
29. Id. at 542, 109P. at371.
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reference to the rights of others and of the public,"3 and the public need
not provide compensation when the police power is invoked to protect

these rights.3 ' In this way, police power is distinct from the power of

eminent domain, where the government may appropriate property for
public use provided it adequately compensates the property owner.32
The police power has long been interpreted to allow state and local
33
governments to regulate the use of property through zoning ordinances
and environmental regulation.34 Such practices have been justified on the
grounds that the motivation behind them is not to change the value of
individual tracts, but to benefit the community as a whole through
intelligent planning of land uses.3 ' These regulations have become more
exacting as growing populations and scientific knowledge have increased
the complexity and scope of state planning. 36 The Washington Supreme
Court has stressed that economic hardship caused by a regulation does
not in itself render the regulation unconstitutional. 37 However, escalating
numbers of lawsuits 38 challenging the burdens imposed on landowners to
preserve the environment and promote rational community growth have
prompted courts to increasingly implement constitutional checks on the
police power to regulate land use.

30. Id.
31. Id., 109 P. at 372. The court stated:
Neither an individual nor the public has the right to take the property of another and put it to a
private use. But it would be manifestly destructive to the advancement or development of
organized communities to put the public to the burden of rendering compensation to one, or to
many, when the individual use is, or might be, a menace to the health, morals, or peace of the
whole community.
Id. See also MeQuillin, supra note 1I, § 24.06.
32. See infra part I.B.3.
33. McNaughton v. Boeing, 68 Wash. 2d 659,414 P.2d 778 (1966); see also G. Bruce Clement &
Egil Krogh, Jr., Regional Planning and Local Autonomy in Washington Zoning Law, 45 Wash. L.
Rev. 593, 595-99 (1970) (describing constitutional basis for local authority to zone in Washington).
34. See, e.g., Sittner v. City of Seattle, 62 Wash. 2d 834, 384 P.2d 859 (1963) (holding that
regulation of air contaminant emissions is valid exercise of police power).
35. Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 27-28; 586 P.2d 860, 866 (1978) ("The
general purpose of zoning is to stabilize uses, conserve property values, preserve neighborhood
characters, and promote orderly growth and development.").
36. For an in-depth look at this process in Washington, see Settle & Gavigan, supranote 2.
37. See, e.g., State v. CSG Job Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 493, 506, 816 P.2d 725, 732 (1991); Sittner, 62
Wash. 2d at 839, 384 P.2d at 862.
38. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has reviewed more land use cases since 1980 than
during its entire previous history. See Richard L. Settle, Exploring the Uncharted Waters of
Regulatory Taking Doctrine, in The New Frontierof Takings Law and What it Means to You: A
PracticalPrimerfor Land Use Attorneys, Planners,and Developers, at I (Washington Law School
Foundation ed., 1995) [hereinafter The New Frontier].
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Limits on Police Power

Washington's inherent police power is limited only by the federal and
state constitutions, which set forth the rights of persons with respect to
government's power.39 The state's capacity to regulate land use is subject
to the requirements of procedural' and substantive due process, 4' equal
protection,' and free speech,43 and to the prohibition against takings
without adequate compensation.' Equal protection, procedural due
process, and the First Amendment play relatively minor roles in
challenges to land use regulations. Substantive due process and the
takings clauses of the Washington and U. S. Constitutions form the basis
of most adjudicated actions and are governed by complex, evolving
standards.
1.

Substantive Due Process

The constitutional principle of substantive due process ' requires that
governments act fairly and reasonably. To be valid, legislation must not
only have a legitimate public purpose, but also must use means which are
appropriate to achieving this purpose and which do not impose an unfair
burden on those affected.4 6 The Washington Supreme Court has recently
rejuvenated substantive due process as an important constitutional check
on police power legislation.47 This trend represents a substantial
divergence from federal courts, which continue to uphold the validity of

39. See supranote 15 and accompanying text.
40. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. This requirement mandates that fair procedures be adopted by the
Legislature allowing the property owner notice and a chance to be heard. See G. Richard Hill,
Regulatory Taking and the AdministrativeProces.;, in The New Frontier,supra note 38, at 6.
41. See discussion infra part I.B.I.
42. To overcome this requirement, the government entity must demonstrate that any different
treatment had some rational relationship to the legitimate goals of the regulation. See Hill, supranote
40, at 7; see also County of Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 69 Wash. 2d 712, 716-17, 419 P.2d 993,
996-97 (1966).
43. See Collier v. City of Tacoma, 121 Wash. 2d 737, 854 P.2d 1046 (1993) ,striking down sign
ordinance impermissibly based upon signs' political content).

44. See discussion infra part I.B.2.
45. Under the 14th Amendment, states are prohibited from "depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
46. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
47. See, e.g., Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct.

1216 (1994).
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statutes absent a clear showing that government could have had no
legitimate reason for enacting the legislation.4"
In contrast, the Washington Supreme Court has begun to express
substantive due process tests in terms that indicate their willingness to
play a more active role in analyzing the connection between a statute's
methods and its stated purpose. The court's broadening vision of its own
role as evaluator of the rationality of legislation under substantive due
process is strikingly evident in recent cases regarding land-use
regulations. In Presbytery of Seattle v. King County,49 the Washington
Supreme Court applied a three-part analysis to test the validity of statutes
regulating the use of private property. ° First, the regulation should be
aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose.5 Second, the means used
should be reasonably necessary to achieve this purpose. 2 And third, the
regulation should not be unduly oppressive on the landowner. 3 Since
Presbytery, the "unduly oppressive" test has been utilized with potent
effect as a separate element of substantive due process that alone can
invalidate a land-use regulation. In a series of recent land use cases, the
Washington Supreme Court has explicitly balanced the state interest
against the private burden to find statutes void under a substantive due
process analysis. 4
Recent Washington interpretations of the protections granted to land
owners by substantive due process reveal two important trends. First,
Washington law has diverged significantly from federal law. The
Washington Supreme Court, in analyzing the reasonableness of a
challenged regulation partly in terms of the fairness of the economic
burden placed upon the landowner, has adopted a test for substantive due
48. See Patrick J. Schneider, Land Use Litigation: The Government's Perspective, in The New
Frontier, supra note 38, at 9-10.
49. 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990).
50. Id. at 330-31, 787 P.2d at 913.
51. Id. at 330, 787 P.2d at 913. Other opinions have stated that this test is satisfied as long as the
legislation is reasonably necessary to promote the health, peace, morals, education, good order, and
general welfare. Hass v. City of Kirkland, 78 Wash. 2d 929, 481 P.2d 9 (1971); Petstel, Inc. v.
County of King, 77 Wash. 2d 144, 154-55; 459 P.2d 937, 942-43 (1969).
52. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330, 787 P.2d at 913.
53. Id. The court mentioned a number of factors which might be relevant in making this
determination, including the seriousness of the public necessity, the extent to which the owner's land
contributes to the problem, the nature of remaining land uses, and the extent to which the owner
should have anticipated such regulation. Id. at 331, 787 P.2d at 913.
54. See Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 1216
(1994); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1028
(1992); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1028
(1992).
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process that has been explicitly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court."
Second, the Washington Supreme Court has displayed a greater
willingness to re-evaluate legislative determinations. 6 This trend is
glaring in cases evaluating property regulations, where the heavy
presumption of constitutionality has all but disappeared. 7
By engaging in such detailed balancing analyses of the relative
interests of the public versus those of the regulated land cwner, the court

has in fact taken on a quasi-legislative role." It remains unclear whether
the "undue oppression" test will extend to police actions that do not
involve restrictions on the use of property, such as economic regulation.5
What is evident, however, is that strong due process requirements have
developed in Washington and now form a substantial, constitutional
restraint upon the government's regulatory power.
2.

Takings

The Fifth Amendment" of the U.S. Constitution and article 1, section
16 of the Washington Constitution6 mandate that government cannot
take private property for public use without justly compensating the
landowner. The difference in wording between the state and federal
provisions provides the basis for a slight difference in interpretation, with
the federal approach representing a floor beneath which state protections
may not fall. 2 Both clauses limit the power of eminent domain, through
which state or federal government may invade or appropriate private
55. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock Island, & Pac.
R.R., 393 U.S. 129, 143 (1968); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536-39 (1934).
56. This growing distrust of legislative findings is evident on the part of ftderal courts as well.
See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992) (advancing that
Takings Clause requires courts to "do more than insist upon artliil harm-preventing
characterizations" of legislative action).
57. See Melody B. McCutcheon, The Uncharted Waters of Takings, in The New Frontier, supra
note 38, at 10.
58. See Schneider, supra note 48, at 12.
59. See, e.g., State v. CSG Job Ctr., 117 Wash. 2d 493, 506, 816 P.2d 725, 732 (1991) ("[i]n
determining whether a particular statute is reasonable, we must conclude . . only that there is a
rational connection between the purpose of the statute and the method the statule uses to accomplish
that purpose.").
60. The Fifth Amendment states, in part, "nor shall private property be taken for a public use
without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V. This amendment binds states under the 14th
Amendment. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
61. Wash. Const. art. I, § 16 ("No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private
use without just compensation having first been made ... ").
62. See supra notes 61, 62; see also William B. Stoebuck, The Future of Takings, in The New
Frontier, supra note 38, at 1.
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property. Through the doctrine of "inverse condemnation," governmental
actions which result in an usurpation of private property rights can be
challenged as a taking and compensation can be obtained.63
Until the 1922 landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal Co v. Mahon,'4
the Takings Clause was considered inapplicable to regulation of the use
of private property.6" In Mahon, Justice Holmes paved the way for
modem takings jurisprudence by indicating that there are constitutional
limits on the private burden that can be imposed in the public interest. 66
He stated that when a regulation goes "too far" it will be considered a
taking.67 Today, when a police power action is determined to be a
regulatory taking, not only will the action be invalidated, but damages
may be due for temporary losses in property value incurred as a result of
the overly burdensome regulation."
Washington's ability to regulate property is limited in two principal
ways by the takings clauses of the state and federal constitutions. First, a
police action is invalid if it invades or appropriates any of the "bundle"
of fundamental property rights associated with ownership of a property
interest.69 Second, a regulation may not go "too far" by imposing
inappropriate burdens upon the landowner.70
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have indicated that if a
fundamental attribute of property ownership 7 is absolutely and
permanently denied, this constitutes a taking per se, regardless of the

63. See, e.g., Richard L. Settle, Regulaloy Taking Doctrine in Washington: Now You See It, Now
You Don't, 12 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 339, 343-45 (1989); First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,314-15 (1987).
64. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
65. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887).
66. 260 U.S. at 415.
67. Id.
68. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
See infra part I.B.3.
69. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982). An
exception to this rule occurs when the infringement is imposed as a condition for granting a permit
for development. As long as an "essential nexus" exists between the purpose of the exaction and the
exaction itself, and the burden on the landowner is "roughly proportional" to the impact of the
proposed development, then no taking has occurred. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 231720 (1994). For a recent formulation of these tests in Washington, see Sparks v. Douglas County, 127
Wash. 2d 901, 904 P.2d 738 (1995).

70. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
71. These include the right to possess, the right to exclude others, and the right to dispose of one's
property. Id. See also Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329-30, 787 P.2d
909, 912, cert. denied,498 U.S. 911 (1990).
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importance of the state interest72 and despite the fact that the invasion
might be relatively trivial.73 Defining the possibilities originally
generated by Mahon more exactly, the Supreme Court also has created a
new categorical taking for regulations which deny property owners of all
economically viable use of their land.74 While conceptually this new
formulation of a per se taking arises from Holmes's "too far" test, the
Court has in effect added a new right-the right :o make some
economically viable use of one's property---to the list of fundamental
property rights protected by the Fifth Amendment.75 According to this
analysis, a finding that a regulatory action is a categorical taking is
rebuttable only if the regulation is designed to prevent a common law
nuisance." The Washington Supreme Court adopted the :Federal tests for
determining a per se taking in Guimont v. Clarke,77 where it "reordered"
the takings formula it previously had expressed in Presbyery."
The takings clauses further limits the state's police power by requiring
that a regulation not go "too far" in burdening the use of private
property. The specific process used for making this determination
remains obscured by a haze of shifting court opinions and substantial
conflict between federal and Washington state tests. Under the federal
test, if a regulation either does not advance a legitimate state interest, or
denies the property owner substantially all use of property or reasonable
investment-backed expectations, then the court will engage in an ad hoc,
factual inquiry to balance the private burden against the public interest to

72. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-15 (1992); Loretto, 458
U.S. at 426.
73. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
74. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
75. See Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 585, 599, 854 P.2d 1, 8 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct
1216 (1994).
76. Id. at 602-03, 854 P.2d at 9. This exception arises from the doctrine of sic utere tuo ut
alienum non Iaedas (so use your property as to not damage the rights of otk ers), which imposes
fundamental restrictions on an owner's property rights. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031.
77. 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1.
78. Id. at 600, 854 P.2d at 9 (citing Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 32930, 787 P.2d 907, 912, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990)). In Presbytery, the court made two
determinations: (1) whether the regulation went beyond preventing a public lbarm to "enhance[] a
publicly owned right in property," and (2) whether the regulation destroyed on. of the fundamental
attributes of property ownership. 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329-30, 787 P.2d 907, 912. The Guimont court
rearranged this preliminary test by asking inste-d only whether the government action deprived the
owner of a fundamental attribute of property, including the Lucas right to viable economic use. 121
Wash. 2d at 600, 854 P.2d at 9. If this question is answered affirmatively, Guimont would hold that a
taking has occurred.

470
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determine whether a taking has occurred.79 In essence, this inquiry allows
the court to make an individualized determination of whether the
regulation was fair to the landowner, but only when either the public
interest it serves is minimal or the private burden it creates is inordinately

high. 0
The federal approach differs significantly from that used by the
Washington Supreme Court. To determine whether takings analysis is
applicable, the court asks the preliminary question of whether the
regulation is intended to prevent harm to the public or to produce an
affirmative collective benefit,' an inquiry considered by the U.S.
Supreme Court to be entirely subjective and useless.8 2 Second,
Washington balances the state interest against the adverse economic
impact on landowners even if the regulation serves a legitimate public
purpose. The existence of an important public interest would end the
federal inquiry."
Together, these divergences from federal law greatly expand the class
of regulatory activities to which the takings analysis applies. This
expansion makes it theoretically possible for a regulation that both is
reasonably necessary to promote the general welfare and does not
infringe on any fundamental right to property to nonetheless be deemed a
taking if the court finds that the burden placed upon the landowner is too
extreme.84
3.

PolicePower Versus Eminent Domain

When a police regulation is deemed unconstitutional because it is
unreasonable under substantive due process, the only directly available

79. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
80. See Schneider, supra note 48, at 1-3.
81. Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 603, 854 P.2d at 11.
82. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024 (1992) ("[T]he distinction
between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regulation is often in the eye of the beholder.").
In his concurrence to Guimont, Justice Utter also questioned the utility of the harm/benefit analysis,
noting that a pollution-control ordinance could be seen as either "prevent[ing] the harm of pollution"
or "provid[ing] the benefit of clean air." 121 Wash. 2d at 619, 854 P.2d at 19-20 (Utter, J.,
concurring).
83. See McCutcheon, supra note 57, at 4.
84. In practice, however, Washington courts usually have resolved such fairness issues through a
substantive due process analysis. See, e.g., Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d I (using
substantive due process to overturn statute even though court did not find an unconstitutional
taking).
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remedy is invalidation of the statute. 5 In contrast, if a regulation is
deemed to be a takings violation, money damages may be paid to the
aggrieved landowners as "just compensation" for the taking of their land
for public purposes." This remedial distinction is extremely useful in
understanding the conceptual differences between the substantive due
process and takings limitations on government's powers. It also
distinguishes the police power, which is strictly bounded by these limits,
from eminent domain, which enables government to lawfully take private
property as long as it provides just compensation. 7
A statute which is invalid because it violates substantive due process
is outside the permissible scope of the police power and therefore is
unconstitutional. 8 Takings claims, on the other hand, are rooted not in an
absolute bar to government action, but rather in a requirement of
compensation if that action appropriates private property for public use.
In an "inverse condemnation" proceeding, a property holder can make a
claim for compensatory damages without attempting to invalidate the
government action itself, because an exercise of the power of eminent
domain is constitutional as long as the state compensates the
landowner.89 In FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles,9 ° the Supreme Court ruled, additionally, that when a police
power regulation causes a taking of a specific landowner's property, not
only will the government action be invalidated, but retrospective
damages may be due for temporary losses in property value or use. 9'
Under the FirstEnglish framework, the regulating entity has the option
to continue enforcing the regulation without modification by invoking its
power of eminent domain to pay prospective damages for the property
value to be "taken" in the future.92

85. Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 331-32, 787 P.2d 907, 913, cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990). Money damages may be available indirectly throu;.,h 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994), which provides tort remedy for violations of federal civil rights. See P.arratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986);
Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765, cert. denied, 506 U S. 1028 (1992).
86. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
87. See supranotes 60-63 and accompanying text.
88. See Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 331-32, 787 P.2d at 913; see also Settle, supra note 63, at
369-71.
89. See supranotes 60-63 and accompanying text.
90. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
91. Id. at 321.
92. Id. at 319-21.
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A police power regulation is thus invalid to the extent that it
constitutes a taking of property without just compensation, because at the
point that compensation is required, the regulation becomes a de facto
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Similarly, when a regulatory
action causes a temporary taking, retrospective damages arise due to an
abuse of government powers reminiscent of a temporary application of
the power of eminent domain.93 At no time, therefore, does government
ever need to compensate individuals for the effects of valid police power
actions.9 4
II.

PROHIBITION OF GIFTS BY THE STATE "IN AID OF ANY
INDIVIDUAL, ASSOCIATION, COMPANY, OR
CORPORATION"
Article 8, sections 595 and

7,96

which prohibit state and municipal

corporations from giving any money or property "in aid of any
individual, association, company or corporation,"97 were part of

Washington's original constitution. They arose from hotly debated
concerns that railroad subsidies, which at the time were widely employed
by many states, entangled the public in corrupt private enterprises and
exposed the public to financial liability over which it could exert no
control.98 Although interpretation of these provisions has at times been

93. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. Government violations of a citizen's due
process rights may trigger statutory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), but, importantly, these
damages only arise when government has acted impermissibly. See supra note 85.
94. See supranote 31 and accompanying text.
95. Wash. Const. art. VIII, § 5 ("The credit of the state shall not, in any manner be given or loaned
to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company or corporation.").
96. Wash. Const. art. VIII, § 7 provides:
No county, city, town or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give any money, or
property, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of any individual, association, company or
corporation, except for the necessary support of the poor and infirm, or become directly or
indirectly the owner of any stock in or bonds of any association, company or corporation.
97. The lexical differences between the two sections, most notably the exception for aid to the
poor and infirm in section 7 and the omission of the gift provision from section 5, have not resulted
in different limitations upon state and local governments. Instead, section 5 has been read by the
courts to create the exact same prohibitions for states as section 7 creates for counties and other
municipal corporations. Health Care Fac. v. Ray, 93 Wash. 2d 108, 115-16, 605 P.2d 1260, 1264
(1980). See also Colin Kippen, Article VIII, Sections 5 and 7: An Examination of the Provisions,
TheirImpact and the Prospectsfor Change I-I I to 1-17 (1979).
98. Kippen, supra note 97, at 1-9. For a more detailed history, see James M. Dolliver,
Condemnation, Credit,and Corporationsin Washington: 100 Years ofJudicialDecisions-Havethe
Framers' Views Been Followed?, 12 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 163, 18244 (1989).
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erratic and confusing,99 a coherent framework has emerged from recent
decisions which enables a reasonable prediction about how these sections
are likely to be appliedlro
For years, the language of these sections was intergreted strictly.
Beginning with Johns v. Wadsworth,'' courts consistently held that any
voluntary payments by municipal corporations to private individuals
without proper consideration were unconstitutional giftfi.' 2 Since the
1970's, however, courts have shown considerably more willingness to
uphold the validity of payments from government to individuals on the
grounds that the public entity received proper consideration for its
payments, °3 that donative intent was lacking," or that the payments
were merely incident to a "recognized government function."' '
In City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma,"6 the Washington
Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of Tacoma's electricity
conservation program, which involved payments to ratepayers who
installed city-approved equipment to lessen energy consumption. The
court used a two-part test to decide whether the transfer of money from
public to private hands was unconstitutional under article 8, section 7.
99. Dolliver, supra note 98, at 185-90; Hugh Spitzer An Analytical View of Recent "Lending of
Credit" Decisions in Washington State, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 195, 195 (1985).
100. As discussed in Spitzer, supra note 99. at 198, the absence of any one of the elements
necessary to cause a payment to be unconstitutional via section 5 or 7 is sufficient to validate a state
action. For purposes of this discussion, the following elements alone are relevant: "No county, city,
town or other municipal corporation [or the state itself] shall hereafter gve any money, or
property ... to or in aid of any individual, association, company or corporation, except for the
necessary support of the poor and infirm..." Wash. Const. art. VII, § 7. Since property rights
legislation similar to Initiative 164 would mandate payments from public funds to private property
owners, this discussion will focus narrowly on the question of what constitutes a "gift" according to
these sections.
101. Johns v. Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 141 P. 892 (1914). Interpreting the language of section 7
literally, the Johns court invalidated payments in aid of an agricultural fair, commenting that "[i]f the
framers of the constitution had intended only to prohibit counties from giving money or loaning
credit for other than corporate or public purposes, they would doubtless have said so in direct
words." Id. at 354, 141 P. at 893.
102. See State ea. tel. O'Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 801, 399 P.2d 623 (1965); State
ex. rel. Wash. Navigation Co. v. Pierce County, 184 Wash. 414, 51 P.2d 407 (1935).
103. See, e.g., Louthan v. King County, 94 Wzsh. 2d 422, 617 P.2d 977 (1980) (holding that bond
measure through which county raised money to obtain development rights in private land was not
gift because development rights constituted consideration for payments).
104. See, e.g., City of Bellevue v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 717, 600 P.2d 1268 (1979) (holding that
reimbursement of city employees for tips paid is not violation of gift prohibition because payment
was made in recognition of services rendered and thus was made without donativa intent).
105. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Johnson, 95 Wash. 2d 255, 264, 634 P.2d 877, 882 (1981)
(holding that child support is "recognized public function" and payments incidental to this function
are therefore exempt from article 8, section 5).
106. 108 Wash. 2d 679,743 P.2d 793 (1987).
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This test has been followed in subsequent cases." 7 First, if funds are
spent carrying out a government's "fundamental purposes," then no
unconstitutional gift can occur. Second, the nature of the transfer must be
examined to determine whether the elements of a gift are present."'
Although the high court in Tacoma found that the city's actions had
been taken pursuant to its proprietary functions only, rather than in
pursuit of a "fundamental government purpose," it overruled the trial
court's determination that these payments constituted an unconstitutional
gift to ratepayers. The court emphasized that because there was no
showing of donative intent, it should determine only whether the city had
received legally-sufficient consideration." 9 According to the court, the
Tacoma program met this test because it clearly would result in a savings
of electricity during the first year of operation."' Furthermore, the
amount of payments to participants in excess of reimbursement for the
newly-installed conservation measures depended directly upon the
amount of electricity that was actually saved."'
The Tacoma court also rejected a claim that additional benefits to
participants, such as increases in property values and lower energy bills,
constituted invalid gifts." 2 The court held that these benefits were
incidental to the larger public benefit of reducing energy consumption,
and therefore the demonstrated savings of electricity again served as
sufficient consideration.' Without explicitly saying so, the court in
essence indicated that the city's intent was to reduce community
electrical consumption, not to tangentially benefit each individual
property owner; therefore, there was no donative intent.
There are two important elements to the Tacoma approach. Initially, a
court must determine whether the nature of the government activity
places it within the realm of "fundamental purposes" which have been
exempted from the strictures of the gift prohibition." 4 If so, there is no
need to determine whether the elements of a gift are present, because a
107. See Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 70 Wash. App. 491, 857 P.2d 283
(1993); Citizens for Clean Air v. City of Spokane, 114 Wash. 2d 20, 785 P.2d 447 (1990).
108. Tacoma, 108 Wash. 2d at 702, 743 P.2d at 805.
109. Id. at 703, 743 P.2d at 805.
110. Id. at 704, 743 P.2d at 806. The court distinguished this from cases in which a "generalized
public benefit" was held not to be sufficient consideration. Id. (citing Adams v. University of
Washington, 106 Wash. 2d 312, 722 P.2d 74 (1986)).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 704-05, 743 P.2d at 806.
113. Id.
114. Id.at 702, 743 P.2d at 805.
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transfer made to private persons in administering a program with such
purposes should not be viewed as a gift."5 If an activity does not fulfill a
fundamental purpose, a court should examine the nature of the transfer
itself, to determine whether it was made with donative intent and with
proper consideration in return." 6 If all attributes of a gift are present, then
the transfer is unconstitutional.
In implementing the first inquiry, the court must distinguish between a
"fundamental government purpose," which is not subject to the gift ban,
and a "public purpose," which is constitutionally necessary to expend
public funds at all." 7 A proposed amendment that would have created an
exception for gifts, loans of money, and other credit in sen,ice of a public
purpose was in fact rejected by the framers during the constitutional
convention."' However, the framers did adopt an exception for the
"necessary support of the poor and infirm,' 9 and this textual protection
has been joined by several judicially-created exemptions. 0 Among those
fundamental government functions that have been held 1o be insulated
from the gift prohibitions are administration of political campaign
maintenance of peaceful labor
contributions,' 2 ' child support,'
relations,'" industrial insurance, 24 and the disposal of solid waste.'"
The rationale behind such exemptions was expressed in In re
Marriage of Johnson,'2 6 in which the court stated that "[r]ecognized
governmental functions are excepted because applying constitutional
115. See Spitzer, supranote 99, at 210.
116. Tacoma, 108 Wash. 2d at 702, 743 P.2d at 805.
117. Wash. Const. art. VII, § I (amend. XIV) ("All taxes ... shall be levied and collected for
public purposes only."). An expenditure of public funds must be in line with both article 7. section 1,
and article 8, sections 5 and 7 to be constitutional. See United States v. Town of N. Bonneville, 94
Wash. 2d 827, 621 P.2d 127 (1980).
118. In re Marriage of Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255,266, 634 P.2d 877, 883 (1931).
119. Wash. Const. art. VIII, § 7.
120. The exemption for fundamental govemmental functions originated in Morgan v. Department
of Social Sec., 14 Wash. 2d 156, 127 P.2d 686 (1942), in which the court seemed to create an
exception to article 8, section 5 for the support of the poor and needy parallel to the section 7
exemption on the grounds that the support of the needy represented a "recognized public
governmental function." Id. at 169, 127 P.2d at 691. See generallyKippen, supra note 97, at 1-12 to
1-18.
121. City of Seattle v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 232, 668 P.2d 1266 (1983).
122. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d 255, 634 P.2d 877.
123. See Public Employment Relations Comm'n v. City of Kennewick, 99 Wash. 2d 832, 664
P.2d 1240 (1983).
124. Hadley v. Labor & Indus., 116 Wash. 2d 897, 907, 810 P.2d 500, 504-05 (1991); Labor &
Indus. v. Wendt, 47 Wash. App. 427,735 P.2d 1334 (1987).
125. Citizens For Clean Air v. City of Spokane, 114 Wash. 2d 20,785 P.2d 447 (1990).
126. 96 Wash. 2d 255, 634 P.2d 877.
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debt limitations such as article 8, section 5, 'would destroy the efficiency
of the agencies established by the constitution to carry out the recognized
and essential powers of government."" 27 The underlying rationale of this
exception should not be understood to be that the existence of a public
benefit in itself constitutes sufficient consideration for a transfer of
28
money, property, or credit from government to a private person,
although a number of cases have hinted that this is so.'29 Commentators
have emphasized that such a doctrine would jeopardize the viability of
these constitutional provisions by permitting the specific government
activities that the framers wished to prevent. 30 By making the nature of
the governmental action a threshold inquiry, the Tacoma court expressly
separated this factor from its resolution of whether the elements of a gift
are present.' If a generalized public benefit were to be considered
consideration for payments from government to private entities, not only
would the court's second test subsume its first, but the test would be so
broad as to make the gift ban effectively meaningless.
If the payments are not exempt as fulfilling a fundamental government
purpose, then a court will next examine the transfer itself to determine
whether the elements of a gift are present. Under article 8, sections 5 and
7, to determine whether a gift has been made courts must look first to
whether there is evidence of donative intent.1 32 Although the standard is
somewhat vague, a transfer voluntarily made, without an exchange of
127. Id. at 262, 634 P.2d at 881 (quoting Rauch v. Chapman, 16 Wash. 568, 575, 48 P. 253, 257
(1897)).
128. See Lassila v. City of\Wenatchee, 89 Wash. 2d 804, 576 P.2d 54 (1978) (holding that despite
public function served by purchase and resale of land to private entity, the transaction was invalid as
gift of credit, because donative intent was strong and no consideration existed other than public
purpose).
129. Citizens For Clean Air, 114 Wash. 2d 20, 785 P.2d 447; Public Employment Relations
Comm'n v. City of Kennewick, 99 Wash. 2d 832, 664 P.2d 1240 (1983); Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d at
262, 634 P.2d at 881. Perplexingly, the Johnson court managed to cite both explanations in
sequential sentences. After explaining that to bar recognized government functions would "destroy
the efficiency of... agencies," it stated that "[t]he public benefit achieved from such activities is the
'consideration' for the funds expended." Id.
130. See, e.g., Spitzer, supra note 99, at 210-11. Spitzer argues:
If, as stated in Johnson, the "public benefit achieved from such activities is the consideration for
the funds expended, logically any public benefit from what would otherwise be a gift to a
private individual or entity would be constitutionally acceptable. For example, increased
employment from government investment in the stock of local high-technology corporations
might be held adequate "public benefit" for what would otherwise be barred. . . . Yet, the
framers meant to bar this very form of government investment regardless of the resulting public
benefit.
Id. (quoting Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d at 262,634 P.2d at 881).
131. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wash. 2d 679, 702, 743 P.2d 793, 805 (1987).
132. Id. at 702-03, 743 P.2d at 805.
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things of value, seems to demonstrate donative intent tinless another,
legitimate, non-donative purpose can be shown. The Washington
Supreme Court has found a non-donative purpose if the transfer was
made with the intention of obtaining adequate consideration in return,'
or with the idea that it was payment for services rendered. 3 4 The Court
also has indicated that when benefits to private persons occur only
incidentally to achieving a valid public purpose, there is strong evidence
that no unconstitutional gift has been made. 3
Finally, and most importantly, the element of consideration must be
examined. Washington courts have recognized different standards for
analyzing consideration, depending upon whether donative intent is
present. If donative intent is found, then the court must determine that
"fair and adequate" consideration has been received or rule that an
unconstitutional gift has been made. 6 Even without a finding of
donative intent, however, a gift has occurred if the payments lack legally
sufficient consideration. This test is satisfied by finding a bargained-for
"act or forbearance."' 37 Thus, the preliminary inquiry into the existence
of donative intent is relevant only so far as it determines hcw closely the
court will examine the sufficiency of the consideration.'3 8
When applied, these standards blend together, but ii is clear that
consideration is legally adequate when the government receives fair

133. Scott Paper Co. v. City of Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d 19, 578 P.2d 1292 (1978) (holding that
extension of water main for benefit of private company was without donative intent, even though
costs far outran revenue from set payments in contract, because city had full intention of profiting
from agreement when it entered contract).
134. See City of Bellevue v. State, 92 Wash. 2d 717, 721, 600 P.2d 1268, 1270 (1979) (finding
that because tips are considered to be "a reasonable and necessary cost for ... service" by city,
ordinance authorizing their reimbursement was %,ithoutdonative intent). However, compare City of
Marysville v. State, 101 Wash. 2d 50, 676 P.2d 989 (1984), in which past servic.-s are characterized
simply as consideration for pension funds.
135. See United States v. Town of N. Bonneville, 94 Wash. 2d 827, 621 P.2d 127 (1980) (holding
that contract to purchase municipal lands, a portion of which would be eventually sold to private
enterprise, did not constitute an unconstitutional gift of credit, because there was no evidence that
city intended lands to be sold to any specific private entity, and thus any benefit to private parties
would be incidental to municipal development plan).
136. See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. City of Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d 19, 32, 578 P.2d 1292, 1300
(1978). Policy considerations justify this divergence from contract law. In gift and lending of credit
cases, the court is not concerned with the encouragement of contracts. It instead oversees such
transactions to make sure government does not transgress its constitutionally apportioned role. See
Kippen, supra note 97, at IV-2 to IV-5.
137. See, e.g., Adams v. University of Washington, 106 Wash. 2d 312, 327, 722 P.2d 74, 82
(1986).
138. See City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wash. 2d 679, 703, 743 P.2d 793, 805
(1987) (citing.Adams, 106 Wash. 2d at 327, 722 P.2d at 82).
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market value,'39 valuable property rights, 4 ' or enough return to cover its
initial investment.' 4 ' Unless there is a showing of donative intent,
however, Washington courts generally investigate only whether the state
or municipal corporation has received a bargained-for act or
forbearance.' 42 Under this sufficiency test, the actual value of the
consideration is irrelevant so long as the government receives something
tangible or quantifiable in return for its expenditures.' 43
III. MANDATORY COMPENSATION OF PROPERTY OWNERS
AS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL GIFT
Washington's power to regulate the use of private land comes from its
inherent police powers.'" This power is significantly restricted by
substantive due process,'45 which requires that government enact laws
that treat citizens fairly and reasonably, and the prohibition against
takings,'" which dictates that property may not be confiscated for public
use without first compensating the property owner. However, if the state
or municipal corporation uses its police power within the ambit of these
constitutional restrictions, it may do so without remunerating affected
citizens for economic losses that its regulations may cause.' Because
only the judiciary, not the legislature, has the power to interpret the state
and federal constitutions, a property rights statute cannot re-interpret
existing constitutional restrictions upon legislative actions.'48 As a
legislative, rather than a constitutional, expression of individual rights,
any percentage-loss statute must conform with the mandatory provisions
of article 8, sections 5 and 7.
139. State ex rel. Gorton v. Port of Walla Walla, 81 Wash. 2d 872, 876, 505 P.2d 796, 798 (1973).
140. Louthan v. King County, 94 Wash. 2d422, 428, 617 P.2d 977, 981 (1980).
141. Scott Paper Co. v. City of Anacortes, 90 Wash. 2d 19,32,578 P.2d 1292, 1300 (1978).
142. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wash. 2d 679, 703, 743 P.2d 793, 805 (1987);
Adams v. University of Wash., 106 Wash. 2d 312, 327, 722 P.2d 74, 82 (1986); Northlake Marine
Works, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 70 Wash. App. 491, 507, 857 P.2d 283, 293 (1993).
143. See Adams, 106 Wash. 2d at 327-28, 722 P.2d at 82-83 (ruling that paying employees at
salary level higher than that corresponding to skill level required by their job was not
unconstitutional, because university received some consideration for wages paid); Northlake Marine
Works, 70 Wash. App. at 507-09, 857 P.2d at 293-94 (determining that perpetual easement and
forbearance of legal rights to disputed property are sufficient consideration for conveyance of public
land to private company).
144. See suprapart I.A.
145. See suprapart I.B.I.
146. See suprapart I.B.2.
147. See suprapart I.B.3.
148. See infra part III.A.
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Under the City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma'49 two-part
analysis, a statute that provides for compensation to landowners for
property value lost because of government regulation would violate
article 8, sections 5 and 7 of the Washington Constitution because such
compensation: (1) would not be merely incidental to ELfundamental
government purpose; and (2) would be made with donative intent and
without sufficient consideration. The payments themselves would not be
"incidental" to any fundamental government purpose because the
creation of individual rights at the expense of public powers should not
be viewed as an integral function of government, and the transfers would
result from a political choice rather than a fundamental public
responsibility. 5 ° The compensation would not be incidental but central to
the conceivable purposes for the law, and so donative intent would very
likely be present. With or without donative intent, though, compensating
regulated property owners would be done gratuitously, because neither a
generalized public benefit nor compliance with the law represent
sufficient consideration for payments made by government to private
persons.'' Initiative 164 and similar measures setting mathematical
thresholds for compensating landowners would -therefore be
unconstitutional in Washington.
A.

CompensatoryStatutes Extend Property Owners' Rights Beyond
Those ArticulatedBy the Washington Constitution

Any future property rights legislation in Washington likely will
establish a percentage level loss in a landowner's property value which
will be used as a threshold for determining when government must
compensate for land use regulations which have caused that loss.' Such
a law would mandate compensation when a regulation causes a reduction
in property value, or similar economic loss to a landowner, that is greater
than a certain percentage of the land's original value. A handful of states,
adopted this sort of percentage
including Texas and Florida, have already
53
claims.
compensation
for
threshold

149. 108 Wash. 2d 679, 743 P.2d 793 (1987).
150. See infra part III.B.
151. See infra part 11I.C.

152. See Stoebuck, supra note 62, at 4--6 (describing possible forms for property rights laws).
153. Louisiana, Mississippi, and Oregon are the others, although only Texas and Florida require
compensation for all real property. Rob Taylor, Referendum 48 Breaks New Ground in Property
Law, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Oct. 17, 1995, at Al, AI0.
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Initiative 164 presents a useful model for examining the specifics of
the exchanges that might be compelled by percentage-loss legislation.
Under the initiative, government would have been required to "pay full
compensation of reduction in value to the owner" within three months of
adoption of most land use regulations.'5 4 While less extreme in effect,
percentage-level laws have the same basic structure: Once a regulation
crosses a certain statutorily-imposed perimeter outlining permissible,
non-compensable regulatory actions, government must compensate for
the losses it causes to property owners.'55
Two major rationales for such property rights laws exist. First, such
laws rest on a belief that, in the interest of fairness, government should
compensate landowners who are disproportionately affected by land-use
laws. In certain circumstances, a few property owners bear the brunt of
burdens which advocates believe should properly be borne by the public
as a whole. 56 Existing constitutional protections, under such a view, are
simply not sufficient to make sure that all citizens are treated fairly. A
second, related rationale is that by obligating government to compensate
for burdensome regulations, this sort of lawmaking will be deterred.' 57
However percentage-loss laws are justified, their overarching
characteristic is that they require payment by the government for valid
exercises of its police power, necessarily extending property rights
beyond those outlined by the state and federal constitutions. While the
Legislature is free to use its understandings of the constitution to inform
its policy choices, it lacks the power to draft laws casting a specific
constitutional interpretation."' This means, for example, that the
Legislature cannot mold a new interpretation of the state and federal

154. Initiative 164, § 4(l)-(3). Initiative 164 would have compensated property owners for any
loss of value caused by government regulation. It was not a percentage-loss law.

155. See. e.g., Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 2007.001-.045 (West 1996) (requiring compensation for
government actions that reduce the value of private property by at least 25%).
156. See, e.g., Kemper Freeman, Don't Believe Opponents, R-48 Protects the Little Guy, Seattle
Times, Nov. 5, 1995, at B7. But see Institute for Public Policy and Management, University of
Washington, Referendum 48: Economic Impact Study of the Property Rights Initiative 5 (1995)
(indicating that to complete the regulatory fairness framework it would be necessary to offset
government liability by taking to account windfalls to property owners from government actions that
produce land scarcity, amenities or infrastructure).
157. See James J. Klauser, Referendum 48: A Prodto Government Restraint, Seattle Times, Oct.
23, 1995, at B5. This rationale raises the policy question of whether a legislature should ever write
laws in order to deter itself. Legislators could perhaps achieve the same result by simply refraining
from drafting burdensome laws in the first place.

158. See, e.g., Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 496, 585 P.2d 71, 83 (1978)
('The ultimate power to interpret, construe, and enforce the constitution of this state belongs to the
judiciary.").
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constitutions by declaring that when a certain percentage loss in land
value occurs due to regulatory actions, a taking has occurred or the
landowner's due process rights have been violated. Legislators can,
however, create certain rights or responsibilities for individuals which
they consider to be consistent with constitutional due process or takings
requirements." 9 As discussed earlier, the police power of the state
60
Legislature is limited only by constitutional restrictions on its exercise.
Because the Legislature cannot define what these restrictions are, any
percentage-loss scheme it adopts will require payment by the government
for actions that fall within the legitimate realm of its police powers.
Legislatively created reimbursements thus find their authority not in
the takings or the due process clauses, but in the State's inherent power
to promote the welfare of its citizens.16' The Legislature has the power to
create private causes of action to remedy the adverse effects wrought by
government activities upon persons.'62 However, because the ability of
the Legislature to draft laws is bound by the mandates of the
constitution,'63 its ability to grant rights to its citizens is also necessarily
limited. Article 8, sections 5 and 7 of the Washington Constitution are
examples of such limitations. These provisions have been interpreted to

act as mandatory restrictions on all types of government actions,
including those undertaken via the police power.'" Police power actions
that contravene the requirements of the two lending-of-credit provisions

159. For example, although Initiative 164 expressly defined when property should be considered
to be "taken for general public use," this definition necessarily could only be for purposes of the
statute, because it is beyond the power of the Legislature to define constitutional terms. Wash.
Initiative 164, § 4. However, the drafters of 1-164 undoubtedly had certain notions of existing
constitutional protections for landowners and likely crafted the legislation to be in conformance with
these notions.
160. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
161. Article 1, section 1 of the Washington Constitution, which states that "governments... are
established to protect and maintain individual rights," presents a possible constitutional justification
for passing such laws. Wash. Const. art. I, § I. However, this clause does not dctscribe a power, but
rather a purpose, for government action. It is also doubtful that this section espouses the active
creation of new individual rights as one of government's purposes. See infra notes 163-68 and
accompanying text.
162. This is what Congress did when it drafted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), which created a right to
damages when a governmental entity violates the civil rights of one of its citizen,. See supra note 85
and accompanying text.
163. See Winkenwerder v. City of Yakima, 52 Wash. 2d 617, 328 P.2d 873 (1958); Trautman,
supranote 15, at 743-44.
164. See Washington State Highway Commissioners v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 59 Wash.
2d 216, 223-24, 367 P.2d 605, 609-10 (1961) (holding that state entity carrying out police power
function of highway construction could not compensate displaced utility comrpanies when these
companies were already contractually obligated to move).

Police Power, Gifts, and Property Rights
are invalid,' 65 as are laws which deprive citizens of their rights to
substantive due process.' 66 Since the Legislature cannot create a
constitutional right that would make payments to landowners obligatory,
property rights laws, like all other government actions, must comply with
article 8, sections 5 and 7)67
B.

Compensation to RegulatedProperty Owners Is Not Merely
Incidentalto a FundamentalGovernment Purpose

The Washington Supreme Court has insulated from the gift
prohibitions a number of state activities that accomplish their vital public
purposes directly by benefiting certain private individuals. The court has
often protected public assistance to individuals that "further[s] an
overriding public purpose or satisf~ies] a moral obligation," thus making
any private benefit incidental. 6 One intriguing potential argument is that
because the Washington Constitution states that governments are
"established to protect and maintain individual rights,"' 69 proposals such
as Initiative 164 fulfill a fundamental purpose by protecting citizens'
rights to be treated fairly by government actions. While article 1, section
1 of the Washington Constitution may indeed indicate that the
maintenance of recognized individual rights is a fundamental
government purpose, this clause does not imply that broadening the
scope of individual rights whenever it is deemed politically prudent
should similarly be classified among government's basic functions.
A percentage-loss property rights law would augment, rather than
protect, landowners' rights in relation to the government. As discussed
earlier, such a law would not maintain the existing rights of
landowners, 7 ° nor would it redefine constitutional provisions that outline
165. Id. at 223-24, 367 P.2d at 610.
166. See suprapart I.B.I.
167. Members of the Legislature of course could propose a Constitutional amendment. Adoption
of an amendment requires a two-thirds vote by both houses and ratification by a majority of citizens.
Wash. Const. art. XXIII, § 1. This process is "manifestly distinct" from the legislature's law-making
capabilities. See Ford v. Logan, 79 Wash. 2d 147, 155,483 P.2d 1247, 1251 (1971).
168. See City of Seattle v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 232, 241-42, 668 P.2d 1266, 1270 (1983). Among
those "entitlements" which the Seattle court indicated to be within this protected class of government
functions were day care for working mothers, free vaccinations to control disease, fare-free buszones, tax deferrals for certain preferred investment projects, and compensation to felony victims.
Id., 668 P.2d at 1270-71. See also supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
169. Wash. Const. art. I, § 1 ("All political power is inherent in the people, and governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain
individual rights.").
170. See supra parts I.B.l-2.
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the scope of government power."' Instead, the Legislature would limit its
own law-making capabilities by extending citizens' right to be free from
unfair regulation beyond this right's constitutional due process and
takings formulations. The question to be answered, therefore, is not
whether government has an intrinsic obligation, emphasized by article 1,
section 1, to be fair to its citizens. Such an obligation clearly exists.'72
Rather, the inquiry should be whether it should be deemed a fundamental
function of government to gradually curtail its own powers.
Unlike the federal Bill of Rights, article 1 of the Washington
Constitution does not just outline individual rights vis-A-vis the
government, but establishes personal rights which may not be violated by
anyone, including other private citizens.'73 Under this conception, article
1, section 1 represents an obligation on the part of government to protect
the core of personal liberty, as expressed in the constitution, from society
at large. The state's police power exists in part to accomplish this task. It
would be illogical to interpret article 1, section 1 to create a
governmental duty to decrease its own powers in relation to its citizens
while at the same time relying upon those same powers to protect the
personal rights enshrined in article 1 from non-governmental actors.
Furthermore, if article 1, section 1 is interpreted not just to create an
obligation for government to protect existing individual rights but to give
a blanket justification for Legislatively enacted expansion of these rights
as well, this provision would in essence encourage government to annul
itself. Under such an understanding, individual rights could theoretically
be extended to such a point that no public powers remain. The effect of
inferring such a fundamental function from article 1, section 1 would be
to declare that one of government's primary tasks is the incremental
elimination of its own existence. The very nature of the ;overeign state
and the police power dictates that this cannot be so."7
Far from being pursuant to a fundamental govermanent purpose,
legislation requiring compensation to certain classes of regulated
property owners should not be exempt from article 8, sections 5 and 7,
171. See supranotes 152-53 and accompanying text.
172. The enactment of unreasonable or overly-confiscatory regulations are in fact beyond
government's constitutionally-allotted powers. See supra note 163.
173. See Alderwood Ass'n v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981).
But see Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 425,
780 P.2d 1282, 1288 (1989) (finding state action requirement implicit in Wash ngton's free speech
provision).

174. See Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 153, 53 P.2d 615, 619 (1936) ('Police power is an
attribute of sovereignty, an essential element of the power to govern, and a function that cannot be
surrendered."); see also supranotes 11-16 and accompanying text.

Police Power, Gifts, and Property Rights
because such government action is exactly what these provisions have
been interpreted to restrict. An important distinction here is that between
7
a fundamental government function and merely a public purpose. 5
Restricting government's ability to grant "entitlements" and pursue other
protected government functions impinges on its efficiency in promoting
the basic needs of its citizens.' 76 In contrast, a politically-motivated
choice to promote the economic interests of a certain segment of the
populace through monetary payments to private entities, albeit in the
interest of "fairness," represents the type of public entanglement with the
private sector that the framers regarded as undesirable 77 and that
subsequent courts have ruled to be impermissible absent a concrete
7
benefit to the public received in return.1 1
C.

Compensation to Landowners Would Be Made with Donative Intent
and Without Sufficient Consideration

As long as the accrued private benefits are merely incidental to a
legitimate public purpose, Washington courts have been reluctant to find
donative intent present in transfers to private individuals.7 7 A property
rights law might have several purposes, including acting fairly towards
property owners, deterring burdensome regulations, or perhaps even
promoting responsible land use. While the preservation of Washington's
public environmental resources and other goals of land use regulations
themselves constitute a legitimate public purpose, compensation to
landowners made ostensibly in aid of such lofty pursuits remains
vulnerable to a finding of donative intent, because the benefit to private
individuals would not be "incidental" to protecting the state's natural
resources. Comparable logic was used by the court in Lassila v. City of
Wenatchee' in holding that the city unconstitutionally lent its credit
when it purchased and then re-sold property to a private party. Although
Wenatchee made the purchase pursuant to a program of municipal
development, the court distinguished this general purpose from the city's
central intent in making the transaction, which was to gift public credit to
175. See supranotes 127-30 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 126-27, describing rationale for holding "recognized public governmental
functions" beyond the reach of article 8, section 5.
177. See Dolliver, supra note 98, at 182-84; Kippen, supra note 97, at 1-6 to 1-11.
178. See Lassila v. City of Wenatchee, 89 Wash. 2d 804, 576 P.2d 54 (1978); State ex. rel.
O'Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 801, 399 P.2d 623 (1965); Johns v. Wadsworth, 80 Wash.
352, 141 P. 892 (1914).
179. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
180. 89 Wash. 2d 804,576 P.2d 54.
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a private entity.'' The remunerative benefit to landowners similarly
would be the primary goal of any statute extending property owners'
rights.
The goals of affirmatively creating individual rights by the Legislature
and deterring the passage of certain laws are more difficult to divorce
from the intent underlying the compensation of property owners.
Admittedly, payments to property owners could be seen as "incidental"
to these goals, although it is perhaps uncertain whether either is a truly
legitimate public purpose. Both were the subject of lively debate
throughout the referendum campaign.' 82 This question is political, rather
than legal, however, and in final analysis it has no bearing upon whether
percentage-loss compensation schemes amount to unconstitutional gifts.
Regardless of whether or not the state intends to gratuitously benefit
private individuals, an unconstitutional gift has occurred as long as the
government does not receive value for its payments. No such
consideration exists for the compensation of regulated landowners.
It is evident, first of all, that under a percentage-loss statute the
Legislature would not be mandating payments to property owners for the
purpose of compensating past services or with any realistic expectation
that adequate consideration would be received. Because the state
Legislature is already constitutionally empowered to enact regulations
without compensating those who experience economic loss as a result,
any past service or other consideration rendered by those receiving
remuneration would simply amount to compliance with valid police
power ordinances. Such compliance is not a service, but an obligation. In
Washington State Highway Commission v. Pacific Northwest Bell
Telephone,"3 the state supreme court held that compensating utility
companies for moving their facilities to make way for highway
expansion was an unconstitutional gift to these entities"8 4 because a
provision in the franchises granted to them by the state already obligated
the companies to move their facilities at their own expense.' In a similar
manner, actions by landowners that are already obligated under the state
constitution, conceptually a contract between the State and its citizens,
181. Id. at810-11,576 P.2d at 57-58.
182. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 156; Roger Wynne, Empty and Irresponsible, Measure Will
Bankrupt Us, Seattle Times, Nov. 5, 1995, at B7. This pair of pro/con articles by Freeman, president
of Kemper Development in Bellevue, and Wynne, a Seattle land-use attorney, is illustrative of the
political debate which occurred during the campaign.
183. 59 Wash. 2d 216,367 P.2d 605 (1961).
184. Id. at 224,367 P.2d at 610.
185. Id. at 218,367 P.2d at 606.

Police Power, Gifts, and Property Rights
cannot give rise to an imputation that government transfers to the
landowners were made with an expectation of return value. These
payments would be entirely superfluous to any conceivable service
rendered.
If a court were to find donative intent, the consideration for
governmental transfers to private entities would have to be examined for
adequacy."'8 Even without a finding of donative intent, the court should
invalidate payments from government to private persons if no bargainedfor act or forbearance were received in return." 7 Any consideration that
might buttress payments to property owners fails even this legal
sufficiency test. Washington courts have repeatedly emphasized that a
generalized public benefit does not satisfy this requirement.' 8 Thus, the
only concrete act or forbearance that might be offered by landowners in
return for state expenditures is to comply with lawfully-enacted
regulations, which citizens already are constitutionally required to do.
Applying traditional Lockean notions of the state, the bargain here has
already occurred. By living in a society which is governed via the
consensual authority granted to the state by a constitution, property
owners as well as all other citizens have the reciprocal obligation to live
by all rules properly enacted by society's governing bodies.
Compensating property owners for adverse economic effects of
constitutionally valid government regulations simply because
conceivable land uses are restricted is akin to paying drivers of Porsches
not to speed. Although Porsche owners might like to drive at the speed
their machine is capable of traveling, and in fact may pay extra money
with the expectation of superior performance, the public welfare requires
that the speed of all drivers be regulated. Similarly, when an investor
buys a piece of real estate, the uses of the property are subject to
restriction in the interest of the general welfare. This is true regardless of
the severity of the differential bet~veen potential and legal uses, as long
as the restriction does not entirely prevent the owner from using the
property. The role of the Legislature, within the constitutional bounds of
186. See supranotes 136-41 and accompanying text.
187. See City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wash. 2d 679, 703, 743 P.2d 793, 805
(1987); Adams v. University of Washington, 106 Wash. 2d 312, 327, 722 P.2d 74, 82 (1986);
Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 70 Wash. App. 491,507, 857 P.2d 283, 293 (1993).
188. See Tacoma, 108 Wash. 2d at 704, 743 P.2d at 806 (stressing that city attained "actual
savings," not just "generalized public benefit," from its payments to ratepayers); State ex. rel.
O'Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wash. 2d 801, 804-06, 399 P.2d 623, 625-26 (1965) (holding that
despite possible promotion of port facilities which might be achieved through hosting potential
business partners, expenditure of funds for this purpose was unconstitutional gift to prospective
customers).
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its authority, is to determine at what point to draw these limitations.
According to the mandatory provisions of article 8, sections 5 and 7 of
the Washington Constitution, it is beyond the realm of permissible
government action for legislators to choose to gratuitously benefit private
entities, regardless of their professed motivation to minimize the adverse
effects of their decisions upon certain segments of the population.
IV. CONCLUSION
Washington's inherent sovereign police power is constitutionally
delegated to municipal corporations and is restricted solely, but
significantly, by the state and federal constitutions. This power enables
the Washington State Legislature, as well as cities and counties, to
regulate the use of property in the public interest. Both -percentage-loss
schemes and more extreme compensatory statutes such as Initiative 164
would pay regulated landowners for lost property value caused, by
permissible requirements and exactions that do not amount to
constitutional takings or otherwise invalid exercises of the police power.
Because landowners already are constitutionally obligated to comply
with valid land-use regulations, a governmental compensation statute in
this form would violate article 8, sections 5 and 7 of the Washington
Constitution.
This analysis indicates that to properly address issues of fairness in
property regulation, the Legislature should modify regulatory actions and
streamline permitting and other processes to be less frustrating for the
regulated. Washington seems to be attempting this. 189 Alternatively, or
perhaps in conjunction with legislative efforts, Washington courts should
intensify their quest to develop a clear constitutional standard for what
amounts to a regulatory taking and what does not. Paying regulated
landowners is not among the procedural alternatives contemplated by the
framers of our state constitution.

189. See 1995 Wash. Laws Ch. 347 (integrating a variety of environmental and growth
management laws into a comprehensive permit review process to simplify and expedite the
application of land-use regulations).

